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Irony and Solidarity: Two Key Concepts of Richard Rorty 
 
István FEHÉR M.  
―Eötvös Loránd‖ University/ 
Andrassy German Speaking University 
 Budapest 
 
Keywords: irony, solidarity, vocabulary, metaphysics, morality, knowledge, hope, 
epistemology, anti-foundationalism,  
 
Abstract: Irony and solidarity are two key concepts characteristic of the vocabulary 
of Richard Rorty. Their thematization can be done on a narrower or wider basis of 
texts. In the present paper I attempt to contextualize and reconstruct them against the 
background of other important concepts of Rorty‘s vocabulary, such as, first of all, 
the concept of contingency. The concept of irony is shown to derive, for Rorty, from 
Sartre‘ conception of the humans who are claimed to be what they are not, and not to 
be what they are. The non coincidence of humans with themselves, or, with their 
„essence,‖ is argued to lead the way to the basic attitude of irony. The concept of 
contingency may be shown to lead up to the concept of solidarity as well, in that the 
realization that what we are we are in a contingent way implies the possibility of 
being radically other than what we happen to be. (I.) In a second step, the basic 
concepts of Rorty, thus far reconstructed, are shown to be dependent on Rorty‘s 
basic philosophical stance of anti-foundationalism; the latter is claimed to have a 
hermeneutical background. (II.) In a final part the outlines of a tradition are sketched 
from Kant to the present, characterized by an anti-metapyhsical flow, whereby the 
importance of solidarity and morality is stressed without the attempt to anchor it in a 
metaphysical theory of humans or any kind of epistemology destined to provide 
knowledge rather than hope. Indeed, Rorty shows that hope stands over and above 
knowledge, and it contributes to making us humans more than a project to attain any 
kind of (secure) knowledge is ever capable of. 
 
E-mail: feher@ella.hu 
 
* 
When trying to gain access to the thoughts of important philosophers one of 
the most customary modes is to scrutinize or closely inspect some of their central 
concepts, or ---with Richard Rorty‘s expression--some of the entries of their 
vocabulary. Looking into the vocabulary of Rorty himself in search for his key 
concepts – in addition to finding that one of the prominent entries of this vocabulary 
is precisely the concept of ―vocabulary‖1 – the two concepts signalled in the title are 
                                                 
1
 Besides the fact that one of the basic concepts of Rorty‘s ―vocabulary‖ is ―vocabulary‖ 
itself, it is also not unessential, and sheds light on Rorty‘s ideas on the finiteness and 
contingency of ethno-centrism, language and community, that while in English the terms 
―dictionary‖ and ―vocabulary‖ are overlapping and synonymous, ―dictionary‖ is only used to 
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very likely to be listed as two of Rorty‘s key concepts. Irony and solidarity: these are 
two central subjects in Rorty‘s thinking, which seem adequate, along with other 
topics, to be used as guidelines for a cross-section of Rorty‘s thinking. The basic 
concepts are however not isolated or independent from each other. They are linked 
directly to other specific concepts, their meaning is embedded into groups of other 
concepts, while they are also interconnected in various ways. (This insight is also an 
important part of Rorty‘s vocabulary as the expression of a basic meaning-
theoretical contextualism). Irony for Rorty is, for instance, connected to liberal hope 
and thus liberalism itself, while solidarity is embedded into some of the particular 
problems of the contemporary world, among others the phenomenon of 
globalization. These key concepts can be reconstructed on various textual bases, and 
to various depths – in the present paper I  will confine discussion to delineating and  
highlighting some of the aspects of ―irony‖ and ―solidarity‖ in Rorty‘s work (I., II.). 
Lastly, based on the reconstruction, I will attempt to present Rorty as the – so far – 
last significant representative of a tradition which may be called anti-metaphysical in 
relating knowledge and action to one another—a tradition, to which he can be 
unproblematically assigned, and to whose thinkers Rorty himself often refers. (III.) 
 
I. 
 
It is of importance for our theme to note that the development of the concept of 
irony is embedded by Rorty into the exposition of the concept of vocabulary as a 
sort of meta-concept. This is hardly accidental, since irony itself (like anything else) 
can only be characterized with the help of some sort of a discourse or description – 
that is, a sort of ―vocabulary.‖ Human beings, claims Rorty as his starting point, 
carry with themselves a set of words with which they tend to justify their actions, 
beliefs, lives. Rorty calls this a ―final vocabulary‖, where the adjective ―final‖ is not 
                                                                                                                              
the forms published as books (language, professional, etc.), while ―vocabulary‖ has an extra 
dimension of meaning which is beneficial to Rorty‘s use. Various dictionaries offer various 
descriptions for this dimension of meaning of ―vocabulary‖; as the Cambridge Dictionary of 
American English puts it: ―all the words used by a particular person‖, The Advanced 
Learner‘s Dictionary of Current English: ―(range of) words known to, or used by, a person, 
in a trade, profession, etc.‖, Webster‘s: ―all the words used by a particular person, class, 
profession, etc., sometimes all the words recognized and understood by a particular person, 
although not necessarily used by him (in full, passive vocabulary)‖; for the term ―dictionary‖ 
in the same dictionaries, in the same order, the following descriptions are given: ―a book that 
lists words alphabetically with their meanings given in the same or in another language, and 
often includes other information‖; ―book, dealing with the words of a  language, or with 
words or topics of a special subject (e.g. the Bible, architecture), and arranged in ABC 
order‖, or: ―a book of alphabetically listed words in a language, with definitions [...] [or] 
with their equivalents in another language [...] [or] related to a special subject: as a medical 
dictionary‖ (see Cambridge Dictionary of American English [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000], 973, 236; The Advanced Learner‘s Dictionary of Current English, 
2nd ed. [London: Oxford University Press, 1969], 1120, 272; Webster‘s New World 
Dictionary of the American Language [Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing 
Company, 1966], 1633, 407). 
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to imply that this vocabulary is beyond history or unsurpassable. It only means: 
unreferential and ungrounded: in case of doubts, there is no way to argue for them in 
a non-circular way.
1
  
 Rorty uses the adjective ―ironic‖ to describe the attitude of a person able to 
confront the contingency of her basic views and desires, who is nominalist and 
historicist enough to give up the idea that these views and desires refer back to 
something beyond time and incidence.
2
 According to the more detailed definition 
the persons characterized as ironic have to meet three conditions: 1. they should 
radically and persistently doubt about their own final vocabulary, because of the 
influence of other vocabularies (considered final by people they know); 2. they 
should admit that these doubts cannot be either confirmed or eliminated by any kind 
of arguments formulated in the current vocabulary; 3. if they formulate 
philosophical ideas about their current situation, they should not think that their own 
vocabulary lies any closer to something such as ―reality‖ than any of the other 
vocabularies; whereby their choice of vocabulary does not take into account any 
kind of meta-vocabularies or it is not motivated by the intent to go forth to reality, 
but much rather by the ambition to replace the old with the new.
3
 
 The three conditions are obviously interconnected, and they are joined 
together by a kind of concealed and here unuttered premise (which appears 
nevertheless in the paper discussed, but only incidentally): the notion of contingency 
(the concept which appears emphatically, at the first position in the title of Rorty‘s 
book). Ironists can never take themselves fully seriously, Rorty mentions in passing, 
for they are aware that the concepts they use to describe themselves are always 
subject to changes – in other words, they are ―always aware of the contingency and 
fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves.‖4 
 I would like to comment on Rorty‘s remarks in two directions. First, this 
observation is a good starting point for clarifying the relationship of the two 
                                                 
1
 CIS 73. Bibliographical note: I refer to Rorty‘s works with the following abbreviations: 
PMN = Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1979); CP = Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1982); CIS = Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989); PP 1 =  Philosophical Papers, Volume 1. Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991);  PP 2 = Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. 
Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); PP 3 = 
Philosophical Papers, Volume 3. Truth and Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); AOC = Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); PSH = Philosophy and Social Hope 
(London: Penguin, 2000). Other abbreviations: : EN = Jean-Paul Sartre: L'être et le néant. 
Essai d‘ontologie phénoménologique, édition corrigée avec index par Arlette Elkaďm-Sartre 
(Paris: Gallimard (collection Tel), 1998); GW = Hans-Georg Gadamer: Gesammelte Werke, 
vol. 1–10, (Tübingen: Mohr, 1985–1995), [vol. no., page no.]; SZ = M. Heidegger: Sein und 
Zeit, 15
th
 ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979). 
2
 CIS xv. Rorty confirmed this summarizing definition almost word by word in a later 
retrospection, see PP 3, 307. fn. 2. 
3
 CIS 73.  
4
 CIS 74. 
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concepts (irony and solidarity) appearing in the title of my paper and the three 
concepts in the title of Rorty‘s book (contingency, irony, solidarity). Second, I wish 
to dedicate some attention to the fact that Rorty draws on Sartre at this point,  
introducing as he does the concept of irony in relation to Sartre‘s ideas, thereby 
offering  an opportunity for an interesting parallel. 
 I propose to discuss the first problem partly detached from Rorty‘s text. The 
concept of contingency is adequate to function as a mediating concept between irony 
and solidarity – connecting and bridging between them. Let us start from the 
relationship of contingency and irony. At a closer look the former leads up  to the 
latter. This is so because the realization that we and our vocabulary are originally 
contingent, that is, not a necessity, suggests a distanced attitude which may rightly 
be called ironic insofar as irony means detachment from the thing, the cessation of 
identification with it, or a kind of hovering above it.
1
 Relating with a kind of 
distance, doubt or modesty to our contingently being who we are – looking at 
ourselves this way: contingent and modest – is perhaps not completely inconsistent; 
and this, coupled with the view that the language and vocabulary we use to describe 
our world and ourselves is just as contingent, means relating to ourselves with (self-) 
irony, that is, a sort of distance.  
 However, in addition to irony, from contingency there is a way leading up to 
solidarity as well. If I am not necessarily what (and who) I am, then I could just as 
well be someone else; and this consideration may lead to solidarity with that 
someone or those others.
2
 It may entail solidarity with those others of whom I could 
happen to be one, although I happen – although not necessarily – not to be one of 
them. I could be one of those others, insofar as it is in a contingent way that I am 
who I am. To distance from myself is to approach to, to make a step towards, the 
others. I might just as well be him (in exactly the way he could be me) – on my view 
this is one of the fundamental (perhaps even hermeneutical
3
) theses of solidarity, 
                                                 
1
 If someone says something ironically, it means that she/he does not identify with it, does 
not mean it literally, and relates to her/his own discourse or chosen vocabulary in a specific – 
precisely ironical – way. 
2
 This formulation is not suggested by some kind of compulsory stylistic modesty, but just as 
much by the choice to be consistent: a philosophy which starts from and centres around 
contingency cannot speak about necessary connections or relations without risking to be self-
contradictory.  
3
 As long as Gadamer‘s hermeneutics considers the other (whether text or fellow human) as 
formulating statements with truth and knowledge claims no less than I do, and who may in 
principle always be right against me. See Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd revised edition, 
revisions by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, New York: Crossroad, 1989, 
reprinted London/New York: Continuum, 1999, 355: „In human relations the important thing 
is [...] to experience the Thou truly as a Thou—i.e., not to overlook his claim but to let him 
really say something to us‖ ( = Gadamer, GW 1, 367:  „Im mitmenschlichen Verhalten kommt 
es darauf an [...], das Du als Du wirklich zu erfahren, d. h. seinen Anspruch nicht zu überhören 
und sich etwas von ihm sagen zu lassen―). See also J. Grondin, ―Die Weisheit des rechten 
Wortes. Ein Porträt Hans Georg Gadamers‖, in Information Philosophie 5 (1994): 28; Idem, 
Einführung in die philosophische Hermeneutik (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
1991), 160. Cf.  Gadamer, GW 2, 116, 505; GW 10, 274; Gadamer: Die Vielfalt Europas. Erbe 
und Zukunft (Stuttgart: Robert Bosch Stiftung, 1985), 29. 
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which is however hardly possible without first acknowledging contingency as its 
presupposition. (If I necessarily am who I am, then I cannot not be who I am, so it is 
impossible for me to be one of the others.) Admitting my contingency – not only the 
quod, but also the quid, not only that I am contingently, but also that I contingently 
am who/what I am, and thereby the fact that the vocabulary which I use to describe 
myself and the world is just as contingent – might beneficially increase my ability to 
identify with other people and their vocabularies (for I could be any one of them, 
and I could use any one of their vocabularies). It is also worth adding: to be someone 
(i.e., a determinate person) and to use a certain vocabulary (in order to describe 
ourselves among other things) cannot really be separated, or what is more, they are 
almost identical. The way we describe ourselves and the way we relate to ourselves 
cannot really be separated. If the self-description (the vocabulary) changes, our 
relation to ourselves also changes, and therefore we change as well. For the way we 
relate to ourselves is mostly decisive also about who and what we are. I am who I 
am because I use a certain vocabulary – and not another one – although this 
vocabulary – let us emphasize again – is itself contingent. Our ―redescription‖ and 
our transformation greatly overlaps; if I describe myself differently, I have become a 
different person.
1
 Irony in this sense is the recognition of the power of redescription 
and the faith in it.
2
  
 Although important enough, it seems less discussed or acknowledged in the 
literature that Rorty expands on the concept of irony starting from and drawing upon 
Sartre. As Sartre constructed his independent and original worldview drawing on, 
but differing in several aspects from, Heidegger, Rorty takes up some of the basic 
thoughts of Sartre and develops them in a direction which primarily highlight his 
own, rather than Sartre‘s, views.  
 The fact that the choice between final vocabularies is incommensurable, that 
it is not taken on the basis of certain criteria, creates a situation of instability – 
claims Rorty – that Sartre called meta-stable.3 Rorty gives no further commentary to 
this term, nor any bibliographical clarification, but after some investigation we find 
indeed this term in Sartre,
4
 namely, in his characterization of the concept of bad 
faith. Bad faith is for Sartre very much a kind of faith; a faith, however,  the first act 
of which is none other than a  decision (obscured even from oneself) on the nature of 
faith itself, a decision which is itself conceived in bad faith, by which this faith 
makes a non-evident, non-persuasive evidence to be the criterion of evidence. This 
structure is originally and hopelessly unstable. Indeed, in contrast to the being-in-
itself characterized by coincidence with itself, by being ―what it is‖, human reality, 
consciousness, the structure of the being-for-itself is, according to Sartre, 
characterized by non-coincidence with itself: it is not what is it, and it is what it is 
not. Considering this, bad faith tries to escape from this ontological nature of human 
                                                 
1
 This relation is best described by Rorty‘s interpretation of the Gadamerian term of Bildung. 
Through Bildung, which has no other purpose than itself, we become different people, and an 
essential moment of this process is that we admit the historical contingency and relativity of 
descriptive vocabularies. See PMN 359, 362. 
2
 See CIS 89. 
3
 CIS 73. 
4
 EN 104. 
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existence precisely towards the stability, permanebce, and coincidence with itself 
characteristic of the being-in-itself. Meta-stability in the wide sense is not only valid 
for bad faith. Human reality – inasmuch as it is not what it is, and it is what it is not, 
it exists at a certain distance from itself (and this is the starting point of irony for 
Rorty) – is itself unstable, it does not coincide with itself, and therefore there is no 
statement about it (in Rorty‘s later perspective: ―vocabulary‖) which could 
adequately ―grasp‖ it one way or another, (linguistically) ―identify‖ it, ―put it in 
words‖, and thus record it. ―I cannot make any statement about myself,‖ Sartre 
writes in a characteristic passage, ―that would not become false the moment I make 
it‖ (―je ne puis rien énoncer sur moi qui ne soit devenu faux quand je l'énonce‖); 
elsewhere he writes: the being-for-itself ―is always different from what may be said 
about it‖ (―il est toujours autre chose que ce qu'on peut dire de lui‖).1 The idea of the 
contingency and plurality of the final vocabulary may be seen from this perspective 
as a consistent continuation of this idea.  
 If we look at Rorty‘s concept of irony in his considerations on Sartre, then in 
addition to a general reference to meta-stability,
2
 the second part of the same 
sentence offers a more specific – and in a certain sense more substantial – clue, 
although Sartre‘s name is no longer mentioned there. The ironists who find 
themselves in the position that Sartre calls meta-stable, in Rorty‘s further exposition 
―are never quite able to take themselves seriously because [they are] always aware 
that terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change‖, they are 
―always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies and thus of 
their selves‖. ―[...] never quite able to take themselves seriously‖: this formulation 
recalls Sartre‘s critical remarks towards the end of Being and Nothingness on what 
he called the ―spirit of seriousness‖, and which takes up and elaborates on what has 
been said in the first part of his work about ―bad faith‖. For the ―spirit of 
seriousness‖ [esprit de sérieux] the values constituting in human projects appear 
―transcendent givenness independently of human subjectivity‖ (―données 
transcendantes indépendantes de la subjectivité humaine‖), and the ―desirable‖ 
(―désirable‖) nature of things is also part of the material constitution of things.3 The 
―spirit of seriousness‖ is characterized by the fact that it escapes the basically 
volatile, contingent, free nature of human reality, unjustifiable and unfounded for 
itself, towards the stability of the being-in-itself. Man tries to freeze himself into a 
rock – as seen about Flerieur, the protagonist of Sartre‘s short story, ―The Childhood 
of a Leader‖ – and strives to acquire some kind of personality and, through this, 
stability, justification of his existence, or self-identification by a thoughtless 
connection to commonplaces, mass ideologies or meaningless views.
4
 The ―spirit of 
                                                 
1
 EN 151, 483. (Emphasis in the original) 
2
 See the expression also in CIS 113. Rorty also uses the term meta-stability, for the 
mentioned reasons, for Heidegger‘s Dasein; the basic Heideggerian terms describing the 
Dasein are inherently ironic, he claims; it could even be said that the Dasein is Heidegger‘s 
term for the ironist. (ibid.) 
3
 EN 674. 
4
 The representation of various forms of bad faith and the spirit of seriousness frequently 
appears in Sartre‘s literary works and essays; see my somewhat more detailed references in 
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seriousness‖, in other words, takes itself very seriously, it tries to be this and this 
(and anchor itself in this and this), identify with itself one way or another with the 
greatest seriousness (thereby concealing that any such endeavour is the result of free 
choice), it flees from freedom and the anxiety that accompanies it, which would 
result in the consideration that to choose something rather than something else in a 
necessary way– as Kierkegaard was already very much aware of it1 – is an 
impossible task. This kind of ―seriousness‖ is not a serious confrontation with life 
and things, but intellectual and moral arrogance and rigidity, conceived in bad-faith; 
it is a flight from freedom and the responsibility that goes with it, from choosing, 
from plurality. 
 
 
Patricia Todoran, Feel 
40 cm x 50 cm, lambda print, 2015 
 
 Actually, Rorty‘s way of taking up  Sartre‘s theme on this point is simple 
and disarming. He takes seriously Sartre‘s critique of the ―spirit of seriousness‖ 
inasmuch as from there he deduces irony as a correct (authentic) attitude in contrast 
to the ―spirit of seriousness‖. Sartre‘s critique of the spirit of seriousness could 
                                                                                                                              
István Fehér M., Jean-Paul Sartre (Budapest: Kossuth, 1980), 33. Elsewhere Sartre 
describes this ambition as an attraction to ―the permanence of rock‖ or the ―impenetrability 
of stone‖ (Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, translated by George J. Becker, New York: Schocken 
Books, 1995, 19, 38). 
1
 See S. Kierkegaard: Entweder – Oder. Teil I und II, Unter Mitwirkung von Niels Thulstrup 
und der Kopenhager Kierkegaard-Gesellschaft  hrsg. von Hermann Diem und Walter Rest, 
München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005, 725: „[...] eigentlich fordert sie [sc. 
philosophy], daß man notwendig handle, was ein Widerspruch ist―.  
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indeed very much suggest this interpretation, but Sartre does not proceed to embrace 
this possibility lying in his own ideas. Irony in Sartre – if at all –appears at most as 
an occasionally sarcastic and defiant unveiling of various forms of bad faith,
1
 
manifest more in our attitude towards the criticized opponent, rather than in the 
(right) relation to ourselves. As regards the latter, the lack of the coincidence of 
human reality with itself appears in Sartre mainly accompanied by pathetic-tragic 
accents; Rorty however simply puts these aside, considers them to be a metaphysical 
sediment. In fact, Rorty still considers Sartre as being ―metaphysical‖ when, for 
example, Sartre calls man ―a useless passion‖.2 And indeed: Sartre‘s oeuvre (in both 
its phases) is penetrated by a kind of pathetic-tragic tone and attitude, which is 
difficult to harmonize with the criticism of the spirit of seriousness, or is itself prone 
to overlap with the spirit of seriousness. The relevant passage at the end of the 
existentialist work is worth quoting: ―Every human reality is a passion in that it 
projects losing itself so as to found being and by the same stroke to constitute the In-
itself which escapes contingency by being its own foundation, the Ens causa sui, 
which religions call God. Thus the passion of man is the reverse of that of Christ, for 
man loses himself as man in order that God may be born. But the idea of God is 
contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is a useless passion.‖3 
 Rorty (and his modest irony) is quite far from this dramatic tone: for him, it 
bears the traces of the sort of metaphysics that he gave up and systematically 
distanced himself from it, influenced by the critique of metaphysics taken over from 
the second period of Heidegger‘s work (and just as much from the tradition of 
American pragmatism). If man‘s ambition to become God as part of traditional 
metaphysics becomes meaningless in the light of a radical critique of metaphysics, 
then it also becomes meaningless to characterize man in terms of a ―useless 
passion,‖ following from the failure of this ambition (and Sartre leaves little place 
for doubting the failure of this ambition). ―The topic of futility‖, says Rorty, ―would 
arise only if one were trying to surmount time, chance, and self-redescription by 
discovering something more powerful than any of these. For Proust and Nietzsche, 
however, there is nothing more powerful or important than self-redescription.‖4 
Dependence on time and incidence as relativity – provided we think with radical 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism, translated by Carol Macomber, New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2007, 39: „Essentially, that is what people would like to 
think. If you are born a coward, you need not let it concern you, for you will be a coward 
your whole life, regardless of what you do, through no fault of your own. If you are born a 
hero, you need not let it concern you either, for you will be a hero your whole life, and eat 
and drink like one.‖  
2
 CIS 99; cf. also PP 2, 131; PSH 61.  
3
 Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, English 
translation by Hazel E. Barnes, London: Methuen & Co, 1958, 615. See EN 662: ―Toute 
réalité-humaine est une passion, en ce qu'elle projette de se perdre pour fonder l'être et pour 
constituer du même coup l'en-soi qui échappe à la contingence en étant son propre fondement, 
l'Ens causa sui que les religions nomment Dieu. Ainsi la passion de l'homme est-elle inverse de 
celle du Christ, car l'homme se perd en tant qu'homme pour que Dieu naisse. Mais l'idée de Dieu 
est contradictoire et nous nous perdons en vain ; l'homme est une passion inutile.‖ 
4
 CIS 99. Rorty repeatedly returned to Sartre‘s topos of man as a ―useless passion‖. See note 19 
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consistency about relativity – is not identical with, and does not account for, futility 
(this could be the reconstruction of Rorty‘s possible answer to Sartre at this point). 
Futility presupposes absolute standards. The ironist might find it meaningful to 
apply the  concept of ―better description‖, but has no criterion for this term, 
therefore the concept of ―the right description‖ is useless for him. So he finds no 
futility in man‘s not being able to become a being-in-itself, être-en-soi. The ironist is 
distinguished from the metaphysician precisely in that he never wanted to become 
one (or he wanted never to want to become one).
1
 
 The human project as an ambition to become God (just as Heidegger‘s view 
in his letter on humanism about man as the ―pastor of being‖2) is hardly compatible 
with Rorty‘s pragmatist attitude, his pragmatic view on man as a cooperative social 
being. In this respect, Sartre was not radical enough for him, or, so to say, not 
existentialist (anti-metaphysical) enough. By contrast, Sartre‘s dissolution of the 
strong relationship of metaphysics and politics is very consonant with Rorty‘s views 
on Dewey, emblematically expressed also in the title of his influential study: ―The 
Priority of Democracy to Philosophy‖.3 In his study entitled Materialism and 
Revolution, Sartre criticizes the view that the materialistic metaphysics and the 
revolutionary attitude are strongly interrelated, and the philosophy of revolution or 
the liberation of man could only be brought by dialectical materialism (that is, one 
could only be a true revolutionary if one were to accept the materialistic 
metaphysics that Sartre considers absurd).
4
 There is no necessary connection 
between metaphysics and political position, and the political position or the 
commitment to democracy needs no kind of philosophical (metaphysical) 
foundation. It is hardly the case that one cannot be a good democrat or liberal unless 
one embraces some theory on some atemporal, unchanged human essence. ―A 
liberal society‖ – goes the rightfully ironic note – ―is badly served by an attempt to 
supply it with ‘philosophical foundations‘.‖5 Its necessity is a concept which goes 
                                                 
1
 CIS 99; cf. also PP 2, 131. 
2
 Heidegger, ―Brief über den ‘Humanismus‘‖, in Idem, Wegmarken (Frankfurt/Main: 
Klostermann, 1967), 175–196, 145–194, here: 162, 172. 
3
 See J.-P. Sartre, ―Materialism and Revolution,‖ in Sartre, Literary and Philosophical Essays, 
translated by Annette Michelson, New York: Collier Books, 1962, 198--256, here in particular 
200 (it is to be asked ―whether materialism and the myth of objectivity are really required by 
the cause of the Revolution and if there is not a discrepancy between the revolutionary's action 
and his ideology‖), 215f, 221, 234 (―But, once again, is the materialistic myth, which may have 
been useful and encouraging, really necessary?‖), 241, 243f . 
4
 PP 1, 175–196. Here mainly 180. 
5
 CIS 52. At the end of his classic study entitled Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1958), Isaiah Berlin approvingly cites the words of Joseph A. Schumpeter: ―To realise 
the relative validity of one‘s convictions, and yet stand for them unflinchingly is what 
distinguishes a civilised man from a barbarian‖ (Joseph A. Schumpeter: Capitalism, 
Socialism, and Democracy [London, 1943], 243.). Rorty quotes both Schumpeter, and 
Berlin‘s commentary on it approvingly: ―To demand more than this is perhaps a deep and 
incurable metaphysical need; but to allow it to determine one‘s practice is a symptom of an 
equally deep, and more dangerous, moral and political immaturity‖; CIS 46.). Berlin also 
writes: ―It may be that the ideal of freedom to choose ends without claiming eternal validity 
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back to the scientism of the Enlightenment. The liberal society is a historical 
formation; however, acknowledging its contingency does not have to shatter one‘s 
committment to it, nor does one have to turn away from it; it can still be loved, 
supported and perfected. And which is not better enforced or confirmed by wanting 
to make it seem necessary by metaphysical or pseudo-philosophical arguments.  
 I have tried to find a connection with irony from the direction of the concept 
of contingency, and highlight this connection in certain respects. And while irony is 
explicitly derived from Sartre, it must be mentioned that the concept of contingeny 
may also derive from Sartre, for it does not appear at all at Heidegger, while for 
Sartre it is one of his central philosophical concepts.
1
 Before proceeding, one might 
also refer to the fact that this connection appears literally in the expression ―the 
ironists‘ sense of contingency‖,2 as something that, according to the refutations and 
reproaches of some liberals, as an unserious attitude undermines the moral operation 
of democratic societies. But freedom is the recognition (not of necessity, but) of 
contingency
3
 – says Rorty through his original and characteristic thesis created as 
the reverse of the well-known philosophical thesis. We excessively and 
unnecessarily overrate philosophy if we want to use it to metaphysically support or 
justify political systems (any such attempt is circular anyway). Liberal democracy is 
much rather in need of concrete social measures to relieve the starvation, pain and 
humiliations of the many (a liberal is a person who thinks that cruelty is the worst 
                                                                                                                              
for them [...] is only the late fruit of our declining capitalist civilisation: an ideal which 
remote ages and primitive societies have not recognised, and one which posterity will regard 
with curiosity, even sympathy, but little comprehension. This may be so; but no skeptical 
conclusions seem to me to follow. Principles are not less sacred because their duration 
cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, the very desire for guarantees that our values are eternal and 
secure in some objective heaven is perhaps only a craving for the certainties of childhood or 
the absolute values of our primitive past.‖ Rorty says largely the same when claiming: ―The 
fundamental premise of [my] book is that a belief can still regulate action, can still be 
thought worth dying for, among people who are quite aware that this belief is caused by 
nothing deeper than contingent historical circumstance‖ (CIS 189.) 
1
 It is one of the most characteristic concepts of Being and Nothingness, see e.g. EN 118. „ 
L'événement absolu ou pour-soi est contingent en son être même.‖; Ibid. 119.: „le pour-soi est 
soutenu par une perpétuelle contingence, qu'il reprend à son compte et s'assimile sans jamais 
pouvoir la supprimer‖. Contingency means for Sartre the lack of foundations – just as later for 
Rorty it  implies the rejection of foundationalism. The Sartrean concept of „injustifiable‖ is also 
characteristic in this respect. (EN 73f, 118f.) Sartre‘s protagonist, Roquentin, says in Nausea: 
„one cannot define existence as necessity‖; „those who exist let themselves be encountered, but 
you can never deduce anything from them [...] contingency is [...] the absolute,‖ (Sartre: 
Nausea, New Directions Publishing 2007, 107.). Sartre uses the concept of facticity as a 
synonym for contingency (EN 119.), while in Heidegger only facticity appears, albeit very 
emphatically (see, e.g., SZ 12. §, 56.: Die Tatsächlichkeit des Faktums Dasein, als welches 
jeweilig jedes Dasein ist, nennen wir seine Faktizität‖), contingency does not (probably 
because Heidegger considers inappropriate the very pair of contingency-necessity; if Dasein 
cannot be necessary, then it cannot be its opposite, contingent, either.) 
2
 PP 3, 325. 
3
 PP 3, 326. 
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thing we can do – claims Rorty‘s definition taken over from Judith Shklar).1 Novels, 
reports and newspaper articles are much more capable of reporting on such things. 
Expressions like ―late capitalism‖, ―modern industrial society‖, ―conditions of the 
production of knowledge‖ must be replaced by ―workers‘ representatives‖, 
―association of journalists‖, ―laws against financial manipulation‖.  
 
II. 
 
Before we proceed, we should mention a thesis of Rorty‘s ―vocabulary‖, strongly 
interrelated with the tenet of contingency, as it has already been implicitly assumed 
in the above considerations as a silent premise. For, as quoted above, not only do we 
―badly serve‖ a liberal society by supplying it with ‗philosophical foundations‘, but 
thereby we also attempt to make something that – in addition to being a ―bad 
service‖ – is also an impossible task: one more reason to give up this endeavour. 
Rorty‘s rejection of any idea of foundations (anti-foundationalism)2 is very closely 
connected to the tenet of contingency – actually, the former is a premise for the 
latter. Views of Heidegger, the late works of Wittgenstein, Sartre, Gadamer and the 
American pragmatists inform Rorty that it is just as hopeless as it is unnecessary to 
find foundations for man, the (democratic) community, for ―values‖ or anything 
else. There is no super-historical human essence just as there is no neutral matrix or 
an ―objective,‖ super-historical viewpoint and language which would not be the very 
own of contingent communities and language games.
3
 The first three studies in his 
contingency book argue precisely for the contingency of the three central concepts 
of Western philosophy: language, the self, and liberal community. By these 
considerations Rorty drew upon himself, of course, the accusation of relativism, 
irrationalism and anti-democraticism, and he took great pains to prove: one could be 
a good liberal without running after metaphysical guarantees in the (false) 
conviction that one cannot believe – legitimately, ―coherently‖ – in Western values, 
liberal democracy, etc., unless one finds appropriate philosophical (metaphysical) 
                                                 
1
 CIS, xv. 
2
 See e.g. PSH xvi, xxxii, 36, 151. (The latter place is a summary of the rejected idea of 
foundationalism: ―Foundationalism is an epistemological view which can be adopted by 
those who suspend judgement on the realist‘s claim that reality has an intrinsic nature. A 
foundationalist need only claim that every belief occupies a place in a natural, transcultural, 
transhistorical order of reasons – an order which eventually leads the inquirer back to one or 
another ‘ultimate source of evidence‘. Different foundationalists offer different candidates 
for such sources: for example, Scripture, tradition, clear and distinct ideas, sense-experience, 
common sense. Pragmatists object to foundationalism for the same reasons as they object to 
realism.‖). Cf. also Ibid. 155. – The rejection of foundationalism is not only based on relating 
to the views of philosophers influencing Rorty; it also has a kind of independent 
―theoretical‖ background, summarized in his biographic writing as follows: ―There seemed 
to be nothing like a neutral standpoint from which these alternative first principles could be 
evaluated. But if there were no such standpoint, then the whole idea of ‘rational certainty‘, 
and the whole Socratic-Platonic idea of replacing passion by reason, seemed not to make 
much sense‖ (PSH 10.) 
3
 See PMN 348f; CP 161, 226; CIS 44, 50, 52; PSH 116. 
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foundations for them. (Just as it was thought once that one can only believe – 
legitimately, ―coherently‖ – in the social objectives of Marxism if one accepted 
materialism, or dialectical materialism as a theory.) 
 In the light of the fact that Rorty shows not much understanding for 
phenomenology, as he considers it a late descendent of Platonic-Kantian Western 
metaphysics
1
 – the idea of philosophy as science, the view that man is a cognitive 
being, whose essence is to know or discover essences
2
 –, it is especially important 
that, seen from the perspective of a hermeneutically transformed (let‘s say, 
Heideggerian) phenomenology, for which things should be taken as they appear (not 
in consciousness, but) in life, Rorty proves, in fact, to be a good phenomenologist. 
Most of his arguments are descriptions, uninfected with inherited theories, 
metaphysics and epistemology, of how things are in real life, for an unbiased regard. 
For instance, to show solidarity to my fellow human beings, I do not need any theory 
on the I or on the human essence; a much more restricted, concrete, contingent – or 
with Rorty‘s word, parochial3 – consideration, or rather emotion, would also do it. I 
help because ―She is, like me, a mother of small children‖4 (and not because she is 
also part of, or embodies, the same unchanged human essence). Nor should we be 
much worried if someone objects saying: our practical activity is only ―consistent‖, 
―coherent‖, if it is based upon an appropriate theory. As things are in real life, 
practice precedes theory – this is what pragmatism, Heidegger, Sartre, Gadamer and 
the late work of Wittgenstein teach for Rorty.  
 The Heideggerian as well as Sartrean thesis that there is no human essence, 
and that human existence precedes its essence is shared by Rorty, too – with the 
single difference that for him this is less dramatic than for the other two 
philosophers, and even entails some ironic consequences. This ironic attitude would 
stand in opposition with the thought of solidarity only if the latter were in need of a 
metaphysical foundation, perhaps connected to the super-historical essence of 
human nature, or the permanent, inalienable human rights. But since this is not the 
                                                 
1
 See ―Philosophy in America Today,‖ In CP 211–230: here 213, 226. On page 226 one can 
read: ―Husserl‘s quest for a phenomenological method was, like Reichenbach‘s logical 
positivism, an expression of the urge for »the secure path of science.« But Husserl was a 
brief and futile interruption of the Hegel-Marx-Nietzsche-Heidegger-Foucault sequence 
which I am taking as paradigmatically »Continental« [...]. What distinguishes Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, and Foucault from Hegel and Marx is precisely the increasing wholeheartedness 
with which they give up the notions of »system,« »method,« »science« [...]‖. Rorty‘s lack of 
understanding for phenomenology is related to the fact that Rorty only wants to hear 
Husserl‘s urge for ―strict knowledge‖ and ―apodictic truths‖ – not unjustly, considering  
Husserl‘s verbal manifestations, but still onesidedly, considering the general practice of 
phenomenology established by Husserl, see PMN 8.); therefore Husserl often appears for 
him next to Russell‘s similar endeavours (especially those that wish to clean logic of 
psychologism, resulting in a complementarity of Husserl‘s term ―essence‖ and Russell‘s 
―logical form‖) [see on this PMN 166f.]); see PMN 4, 8, 166ff, 269, 369, 390; CP xvi, 37f, 
160, 165, 169; PP 2, 10, 12, 19, 21, 23, 32, 109ff; PSH 176. 
2
 PMN 367. 
3
 See e.g. CIS 73; PP 1, 21. 
4
 CIS 191. 
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case, the lack of such a foundation is not a barrier to solidarity. If we look at things 
as they are, we see: helpfulness is not a matter of adequate theories.  
 The dilemma lies in the fact that, while solidarity seems to be a serious thing, 
it raises the question: could anyone feel solidarity for others while being ironic at the 
same time? In other words: can anyone show solidarity ironically? Is it not a 
contradiction? Rorty senses this possible reproach himself. As he writes in the 
introduction to his book on contingency: ―ironism has often seemed intrinsically 
hostile not only to democracy but to human solidarity.‖1 However, this presupposition, 
as he convincingly argues, is basically false. ―[...] But it is not. Hostility to a particular 
historically conditioned and possibly transient form of solidarity is not hostility to 
solidarity as such.‖,2 he writes. What he calls here ―Hostility to a particular historically 
conditioned and possibly transient form of solidarity‖, refers in fact to the concepts of 
solidarity with metaphysical foundation. Solidarity however, and this is Rorty‘s main 
thesis, is not a matter of philosophical investigation and theoretical foundation. Nor is 
it the result of research or reflection: it is simply a product of imagination or 
―imaginative ability,‖ it simply rests on our ability ―to see strange people as fellow 
sufferers.‖3 To see the other, the strange people (not necessarily as a fellow human 
being in the first place, but) as fellow sufferers: this summarizes the concept of 
solidarity. One may speak about ―imagination‖ because pain, as Rorty convincingly 
explains, is not a linguistic phenomenon. People who are the victims of cruelty, who 
suffer hardly have words or a message to express in language. What could they 
possibly ―say‖? Some kind of objective ―accounts‖ or ―reports‖ on their suffering? 
Therefore there is hardly anything like the ―voice of the oppressed‖ or the ―language 
of the victims‖. The language once used by victims no longer functions, or the victims 
have suffered too much to be able to coin new words. Therefore the linguistic 
expression of their situation is a work that someone else must do for them. The liberal 
novelist, poet or journalist know how to do that – the liberal theoretician does not.4  
 Rorty later describes the concept of ―imaginative ability‖ as ―imaginative 
acquaintance‖, ―skill at imaginative identification‖.5 Solidarity is much more about 
this, rather than an agreement upon common metaphysical truths. Meditations on 
―human nature‖ or ―human dignity‖ presuppose a great deal of reflection, while the 
sufferers hardly have access to such reflections or the ―vocabulary‖ created in result. 
―Such reflection will not produce anything except a heightened awareness of the 
possibility of suffering,‖ but it ―will not produce a reason to care about suffering.‖6 
We may of course ease our (theoretical) consciousness by creating a new theory on 
                                                 
1
 CIS xv; cf. Ibid. 87.  
2
 CIS xv. 
3
 CIS xvi. 
4
 CIS 94.: ―Pain is nonlinguistic [...] So victims of cruelty, people who are suffering, do not 
have much in the way of a language. That is why there is no such things as the ‘voice of the 
oppressed‘ or the ‘language of the victims‘. The language the victims once used is not 
working anymore, and they are suffering too much to put new words together. So the job of 
putting their situation into language is going to have to be done for them by somebody else. 
The liberal novelist, poet, or journalist is good at that. The liberal theorist is not.‖  
5
 CIS 92f, 190f. 
6
 CIS 93. 
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human nature or the inalienable human rights, but have we thereby helped those who 
suffer? Is it this – a new theory – that they need? Is it not bad faith to ease the 
consciousness this way? Rorty‘s fundamental reproach that he addressed to the 
American left – primarily the university left, that Allan Bloom called ―Nietzscheized‖ 
– was that, besides the sweeping criticism and over-sophisticated, or, better said, 
―over-philosophized‖ theoretical commentaries of Western civilization, ―rotten to the 
core‖, it has lost all receptivity or susceptibility to the suffering and dispossessed; 
apart from the global criticism of the ―system,‖ it has nothing to say, it has no 
recommendations about practical actions, or the political reforms to reduce inequality 
– it looks into the distant future, and disregards the present.1 
 The connection of solidarity as a matter of imagination to irony, as 
mentioned before, can be presented with the mediation of the concept of 
contingency. Taking up my previous formulation: the insight that I am who (and 
what) I am not by necessity, but by contingency, is equal to the insight that I could 
be someone else as well; and this may lead to the solidarity and empathy with 
other(s). What can be added to all these, is the role of imagination and imaginative 
identification in this process. Irony, or the lack of stable self-identification, the 
abandonment of one‘s identification once and for all makes one receptive to the 
understanding and experience of life situations which could be one‘s own, and it 
ultimately points in the direction of community existence. ―Solidarity – the 
recognition of the other as your equal and as entitled to your sympathy – is the 
natural companion of irony, and becomes, for Rorty, the true basis of political life‖ – 
writes Roger Scruton.
2
  
 Rorty takes up and develops several themes of Gadamer‘s hermeneutics, and 
the idea of solidarity appears at Gadamer as well. Not unimportantly, the concept 
appears in Gadamer‘s major work as one of the leading humanist concepts. This 
means that – as I shall soon dwell on it a little – there is a connection between 
humanism and solidarity: humanism is related to solidarity, and solidarity refers to 
humanism. The concept of solidarity appears in Gadamer amongst the leading 
humanist concepts, in the analyses of sensus communis, but since the leading 
humanist concepts (―formation‖, ―sensus communis‖, ―power of judgment‖, ―taste‖) 
are interconnected on several levels – their common characteristic is that they do not 
give some general knowledge that still needs to be applied, but a knowledge which 
is just as much existence, and having-become existence, which carries the 
application within itself, and thus in each case it is a knowledge for life which has its 
place in the life of people, or rather the community life, for which reason it is 
connected to all of them, especially the most important leading concept of the 
leading concepts themselves, Bildung. 
 ―The sensus communis is an element of social and moral being‖, writes 
Gadamer, and this concept, in the course of its long history expressed, from time to 
                                                 
1
 See PSH 129; AOC 78ff, 98. Only the rightists speak about the consequences of 
globalization. (AOC 91.). Cf. also PP 2, 133. 
2
 Roger Scruton, ―Richard Rorty‘s legacy‖, 12 June 2007 – emphasis by I. F. M.; see: 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy_power/people/richard_rorty_legacy). 
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time, ―a polemical attack on metaphysics,‖1 or in other words, a criticism ―against 
the theoretical speculations of the philosophers.‖2  From this perspective, there 
appears here the motif of the humanist opposition to scholastics, in addition to the 
community creating aspect (sensus communis is the sense that makes a 
community
3
). The fact that Gadamer opposes the leading humanist concepts and 
humanism in general to the ―school‖,4 that is, to scholasticism and the scholastic 
ideal of learning corresponds to the way Rorty opposes the ―mainstream‖  
epistemology- or metaphysics-based European philosophy, and the self-serving (and 
not less conceited) theory and knowledge creation of its newest form, ―analytical 
philosophy‖; or – in this particular case – the metaphysical foundation of the idea of 
solidarity, or any kind of philosophical approach to ―human nature‖ for that matter. 
Sensus communis is a ―social virtue‖ for Shaftesbury, stresses Gadamer, and he 
mentions with consent that ―ancient Roman concepts [...] include in humanitas a 
refined savoir vivre, the attitude of the man who understands a joke and tells one 
because he is aware of a deeper union with his interlocutor.‖5 The idea of solidarity 
also appears later in connection with community feeling, insofar as this is precisely a 
―genuine moral and civic solidarity‖.6 It is not without significance that in one of his 
later works, Gadamer also developed the central concept of hermeneutics, 
understanding, in the direction of solidarity: understanding the other is to make an 
effort to think with and show solidarity with him; solidarity is the basic premise to 
form common convictions, albeit slowly, and in this sense understanding has a 
―significance for world politics‖(―weltpolitische Bedeutung des Verstehens‖).7 
                                                 
1
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 29 (= GW 1, 38: ―Der sensus communis ist ein Moment des 
bürgerlich-sittlichen Seins. Auch wo dieser Begriff, wie im Pietismus oder in der Philosophie 
der Schotten, eine polemische Wendung gegen die Metaphysik bedeutet, bleibt er damit noch 
in der Linie seiner ursprünglichen kritischen Funktion.‖) 
2
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 20 (= GW 1, 28: „ein gegen die theoretische Spekulation der 
Philosophen gerichteter Ton‖). 
3
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 19: „here sensus communis obviously does not mean only 
that general faculty in all men but the sense that founds community.‖ ( = GW 1,  26: „Sensus 
communis meint hier offenkundig nicht nur jene allgemeine Fähigkeit, die in allen Menschen 
ist, sondern er ist zugleich der Sinn, der Gemeinsamkeit stiftet.‖) 
4
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 18 (= GW 1, 26). 
5
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 22 (= GW 1, 30: Shaftesbury „folgt […] auch darin 
altrömischen Begriffen, die in der humanitas die feine Lebensart mit einschlossen, die 
Haltung des Mannes, der Spaß versteht und macht, weil er einer tieferen Solidarität mit 
seinem Gegenüber gewiß ist.‖) 
6
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 29 (= GW 1, 38: ―echte sittlich-bürgerliche Solidarität‖). 
7
 H.-G. Gadamer, ―Vom Wort zum Begriff‖ (1995). In Gadamer Lesebuch. ed. J. Grondin 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1997), 100–110, here 109, 108. I think it is evident that understanding-
agreement is inherently related to solidarity. These  implications of Gadamer‘s hermeneutics, 
related to the philosophy of science,  were expanded by Rorty. He formulated in his major 
work that the only usable meaning of the concept of ―scientific objectivity‖ was ―agreement‖ 
(PMN 33: ―our only usable notion of ‘objectivity‘ is ‘agreement‘, rather than mirroring‖); and 
that scientific praxis as such, with its need for objectivity and rationality, is rooted in a 
determined form of human cohabitation: solidarity. This idea was later expressed in several of 
his writings: „the only sense in which science is exemplary is that it is a model of human 
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 The relation of understanding and solidarity is therefore fundamental for 
Gadamer: one could formulate the thesis ―the more understanding, the more 
solidarity‖. Irony is the point where Rorty enriches the picture compared to Gadamer 
– and, as we have seen, also Sartre. Although the relation of irony and solidarity at 
Rorty is predicted by some background aspects in Gadamer; for instance, that 
Gadamer first mentions solidarity in connection to jesting as if taking one step 
towards Rorty‘s subsequent concept of irony.  
 Rorty hardly ever uses the concept of understanding. Therefore Gadamer‘s 
thesis ―the more understanding, the more solidarity‖ can only be loosely connected 
to Rorty. Another thesis can be connected to this one however, which is more 
justified for Rorty as well: ―the more Bildung, the more solidarity‖. 
 There are two considerations in connecting this thesis to Rorty‘s thinking: a 
general and a specific one. The first one: explaining the Gadamerian concept of 
Bildung, Rorty explains emphatically and legitimately that this concept is for Gadamer 
the alternative of ―knowledge‖ (―as the purpose of thinking‖). Bildung is not so much 
about gaining ―knowledge‖ (as the faithful representation of reality), but about 
something radically different: to ―become different persons‖, ― ‗recreate‘ ourselves‖.1 
The recreation of ourselves (with or without redescription) is one of Rorty‘s central 
issues,
2
 and the premise of this is our own unfixed nature and the irony by which we 
admit it, which is connected to solidarity – thus Gadamer‘s concept of Bildung and 
Rorty‘s concepts of irony and solidarity are comprehensively interconnected.  
 The more specific connection can be elucidated starting from the concepts of 
―imaginative ability‖, ―imaginative acquaintance‖, ―skill at imaginative 
idenitification‖. Emphasizing the practical aspect of his concept of understanding, 
Gadamer referred to the fact that ―understanding [...] is especially able to contribute 
to the extension of our human experiences, self-knowledge, and horizon of world.‖3 
                                                                                                                              
solidarity.‖(PP 1, 39f.) Rorty then extended to notion of solidarity to other, wider fields of 
community existence. See e.g. ―Solidarity‖, CIS 189–198. 
1
 PMN 359. „Metaphysicians think‖–writes Rorty elsewhere– „that human beings by nature 
desire to know‖ (CIS 75). They are opposed to the ironists, who think that the purpose of 
discursive thinking is not knowledge in the sense of ―reality‖, ―true essence‖, ―objective 
viewpoint‖, ―the correspondence of language of [recte: to] reality‖. Their purpose is not the 
representation of reality.  
2
 See e.g. Rorty‘s requirements for the ―humanist intellectual‖. ―[The humanistic intellectuals‘] 
idea of teaching–or at least of the sort of teaching they hope to do–is not exactly the 
communication of knowledge, but more like stirring the kids up. When they apply for a leave 
or a grant, they may have to fill out forms about the aims and methods of their so-called 
research projects, but all they really want to do is read a lot more books in the hope of 
becoming a different sort of person.‖ (PSH 127). Elsewhere he writes: ―Unmethodical criticism 
of the sort which one occasionally wants to call ‘inspired‘ is the result of an encounter with an 
author, character, plot, stanza, line or archaic torso which has made a difference to the critic‘s 
conception of who she is, what she is good for, what she wants to do with herself: an encounter 
which has rearranged her priorities and purposes‖. (PSH 145). 
3
 Gadamer, ―Hermeneutik als praktische Philosophie‖. Rehabilitierung der praktischen 
Philosophie, ed. M. Riedel (Freiburg i.Br.: Rombach, 1972), vol. I, 342f. ―Verstehen [...] 
vermag in besonderer Weise dazu beizutragen, unsere menschlichen Erfahrungen, unserer 
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Dilthey also wrote about the effect of the extension of the horizon on our being in 
the introduction of his classic study on hermeneutics: ―Our action always 
presupposes the understanding of other persons; the major part of human happiness 
derives from the reminiscence of strange states of mind [...] The historical 
consciousness built on these makes it possible for the modern man to possess the 
entire past of the humanity as being there in itself: it gains insight into foreign 
cultures beyond all limits of his own age; it absorbs their power and enjoys their 
magic; and from this derives a major increase of happiness for himself.‖1 Dilthey 
talked about the ―never satisfied need‖ to ―complete our individuality by 
contemplating the individuality of others‖, and that ―understanding and 
interpretation [...] are always alive in life itself.‖2 
 The widening of horizon happening through Bildung, as long as it is able to 
shape one‘s personality, changes not only the knowledge, but also the existence of 
man, thus it has a community creating function and has an effect of increasing 
solidarity. Bildung can increase that which solidarity depends on in Rorty‘s view: 
the imaginative ability, the imaginative acquaintance, and the skill at imaginative 
identification. Education makes one able to imaginative identification. As a result of 
the extension of horizon caused by Bildung man learns to take into account the 
perspective of others, to see the world as they see it. The reverse side of it is that 
meanwhile he also learns: the way he sees the world is only one possible way to see 
it. And this, in Rorty‘s perspective, means irony (and not to the least the awareness 
of our contingency). Only the uneducated may think that things cannot be otherwise 
than the way they see them.  
                                                                                                                              
Selbsterkenntnis und unseren Welthorizont auszuweiten‖ (emphasis by I. F. M.). Eduard 
Spranger speaks about the  ―Ausweitung der Individualität über sich selbst hinaus‖ in 
reference to Humboldt (Spranger, Wilhelm von Humboldts Humanitätsidee [Berlin: Reuther 
& Reichard, 1909], 2
nd
 ed. 1928, 12.). See also the similar ideas in Andrew Abbott‘s 
influential speech: ―Education is a way of expanding experience. [...] education is good in 
itself because it expands the range of your experience, both temporally and spatially. [...] 
education is a habit that expands experience‖ (Andrew Abbott, ―The Aims of Education 
Address‖, The University Of Chicago Record (21 November 2002): 4–8: here 7;  see 
http://home.uchicago.edu/~aabbott/Papers/aims2.pdf>;  reprint: ―Welcome to the University 
of Chicago‖. Forschung und Lehre, 8 (2007, Supplement): 1–22: here 17f. 
1
 W. Dilthey, ―Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik‖, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5, 317: „Unser 
Handeln setzt das Verstehen anderer Personen überall voraus; ein großer Teil menschlichen 
Glücks entspringt aus dem Nachfühlen fremder Seelenzustände; die ganze philologische und 
geschichtliche Wissenschaft ist auf die Voraussetzung gegründet, daß das Nachverständnis 
des Singulären zur Objektivität erhoben werden könne. Das hierauf gebaute historische 
Bewußtsein ermöglicht dem modernen Menschen, die ganze Vergangenheit der Menschheit 
in sich gegenwärtig zu haben: über alle Schranken der eigenen Zeit blickt er hinaus in die 
vergangenen Kulturen; deren Kraft nimmt er in sich auf und genießt ihren Zauber nach: ein 
großer Zuwachs von Glück enstpringt ihm hieraus‖  Dilthey‘s formulation contains 
nevertheless an ―aestheticist‖ undertone (the attitude of the ―lover of art‖), which is later 
criticized by Heidegger and Gadamer. 
2
 W. Dilthey, ―Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik‖, 328: „Und nun kommt diesem Werk das 
unersättliche Bedürfnis entgegen, die eigne Individualität zu ergänzen durch die Anschauung 
anderer. Verstehen und Interpretation sind so im Leben selber immer regsam und tätig.― 
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 The educated man, writes Hegel, ―also learns that there are other and better 
ways of behaviour and action, and that his is not the only possible way.‖1 
Interpreting the discussion of the concept of Bildung in Hegel‘s Propedeutic, 
Gadamer writes:  ―contemplating ourselves and our purposes with distance means to 
look at these in the way that others see them‖.2 We should realize that, seen from 
Rorty‘s perspective, to ―contemplate with distance‖ implies irony, for the latter 
means precisely giving up the naive identification with ourselves; it means 
distancing ourselves from ourselves. If one learns other ways to judge things, he 
remains less of a captive of the provincial narrow-mindedness
3
 which closes him up 
in the world of his own restricted environment and experiences. One remains less of 
a captive of the naive belief that the world cannot be seen otherwise than one sees it.  
 Rorty is also familiar with this closing up within oneself, and makes a critical 
remark about it. Interestingly enough, and unusually for Anglo-Saxon philosophy, as 
well as for his own thinking, he identifies the criticized viewpoint, not unjustly, as a 
kind of common sense perspective. ―The opposite of irony is common sense‖ – he 
writes. It is characteristic for those who describe everything with the help of the final 
vocabulary that they and their environment are used to. This kind of common sense 
takes it for granted that the statements formulated in its final vocabulary are also 
appropriate to describe the actions and life of those who use other final vocabularies.
4
 
It would be a kind of philosophical extension or levelling of the common sense, as 
urged by the ―metaphysicians‖ to justify the standpoint of the common sense. The 
metaphysicians do not question the plain truths of common sense – they do not offer 
redescriptions – but they analyze old descriptions with the help of old descriptions, 
insisting on the principle of the one true reality and vocabulary.
5
 The ironist opposes 
both of them – both the common sense and the metaphysics of the common sense. 
Rorty‘s opposition at this point can be seen as the opposition between narrow-
mindedness and Bildung. The former, narrow-mindedness, is characteristic thus both 
for common sense and metaphysics. Open-mindedness, on the contrary, means irony 
and awareness of contingency; it sensitizes for solidarity and identification with other 
people. It makes me aware that I might just as well be the person who suffers. Bildung 
and the awareness of contingency opposes narrow-mindedness, the conceitedness of 
common sense, as well as the philosophy that justifies it, and last but least the self-
satisfied, posing attitude of self-righteousness.
6
  
                                                 
1
 Hegel, Philosophische Propädeutik, §. 42. Theorie Werkausgabe. vol. 4, 259. (―Indem der 
Mensch über das, was er unmittelbar weiß und erfährt, hinausgeht, so lernt er, daß es auch 
andere und bessere Weisen des Verhaltens und Tuns gibt und die seinige nicht die einzig 
notwendige ist. [...]‖). 
2
 See Gadamer, GW 1, 22f.: „Sich selbst und seine privaten Zwecke mit Abstand ansehen, 
heißt ja: sie ansehen, wie die anderen sie sehen‖. 
3
 Cf. Andrew Abbott, ―The Aims of Education Address‖: ―[...] education is a habit that 
expands experience so as to overcome that provinciality by increasing ties between your 
locality and other human meanings.‖ See note 54 above.  
4
 CIS 74. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 See my remarks on this attitude in István Fehér M., ―Hermeneutika és humanizmus‖ 
(Hermeneutics and Humanism),in Hans-Georg Gadamer - egy 20. századi humanista (Hans-
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III. 
 
Insofar as a moral-political stance and action renounces any kind of philosophical 
(theoretical, metaphysical) foundation in addition to emphasizing the idea of 
solidarity and the importance (and absolute primacy for life) of such a stance and 
action,
1
 Rorty is only the last link in the chain of a respectable tradition, which 
started with Kant in the modern age, and displayed names such as Kierkegaard, 
Rickert and neo-Kantianism, Weber, Heidegger and Sartre, Popper and Feyerabend. 
This tradition is characterized by the conviction that practical action, a right life 
lived with morality, based on freedom and responsibility is not dependent on 
knowledge, and especially not on metaphysical knowledge (on the world‘s 
‖objective‖ essence and human essence) – to the extent that the latter is opposed to 
it, and makes it impossible, rather than possible. Taking it one step forward and 
formulating it sharply: aim and pursuit to metaphysically ground morality, in 
ultimate analysis, and not quite unjustly, can also be placed under moral suspicion. 
To present the main stations of this tradition as a last step is even more justified 
because Rorty refers to some of the authors as precedents of his own views.  
 The presented point of view appears in Kant‘s radical approach.2 The 
Critique of Pure Reason, according to Kant‘s self-understanding, forces the 
speculative mind within barriers, and its role is negative in this sense, but its 
important positive effect is that ―it eliminates an obstacle which threatens the [pure 
                                                                                                                              
Georg Gadamer – a 20th century humanist), ed. Miklós Nyìrő (Budapest: L'Harmattan, 2009), 
43–117: here 104ff. This attitude, rejected by Emilio Betti, then by Rorty and Gadamer, was 
not unknown to the classical liberal tradition. John Stuart Mill wrote about it as ―moral 
police‖. Mill, On Liberty (London: Watts & Co., 1936), 105. Mill also adds: this is one of the 
most universal of human attitudes. The term ―righteous indignation‖ also appears at Rorty, 
see PP 1, 37. 
1
 This stance is best summarized in the fragment quoted in note 26: ―The fundamental 
premise of [my] book is that a belief can still regulate action, can still be thought worth dying 
for, among people who are quite aware that this belief is caused by nothing deeper than 
contingent historical circumstance‖ (CIS 189). The claim of contingency means here to 
renounce any kind of (ultimate philosophical) foundation, or any kind of (historical, 
philosophical, or other) necessity, or any ultimate certainty about life conduct or anything 
else. Briefly and sharply: life usually needs no kind of theory; but if it still does, definitely 
not the kind that makes a contingent practice seem necessary and leads to self-deception.  
2
 The reconstruction below is the– partly shortened, partly extended – exposition of thought 
that I formulated in some of my earlier writings in different contexts: István Fehér M., Az 
élet értelméről. Racionalizmus és irracionalizmus között (On the meaning of life. Between 
rationalism and irrationalism) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1991), 35–43; ―Sartre, hermeneutika, 
pragmatizmus‖ (Sartre, hermeneutics, pragmatism), Holmi VI/12 (1994), 1810–1831: here 
1820f, 1828f; ―Polgári kultúra, polgári műveltség, polgári filozófia: Kant és a 
neokantianizmus világszemlélete. I. rész" (Bourgeois culture, bourgeois culture, bourgeois 
philosophy: Kant and the worldview of neo-Kantianism), Protestáns Szemle 1 (2002):  29–
55: here 33–36; ―Hermeneutika, etika, nyelvfilozófia" (Hermeneutics, ethics, philosophy of 
langauge), Világosság 5-6 (2003): 73–81: here 75f. 
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practical] reason [...] with complete elimination.‖1 That our knowledge is restricted 
to phenomena revealed by experience, and we cannot know the world-in-itself, is 
definitely a disadvantage from the point of view of knowledge. But this disadvantage 
is fully balanced by admitting: if the necessary order of the world revealed by 
knowledge gave us not only the world of phenomena, but the world-in-itself too, 
then the causal relation would become universal, and would extend to the being-in-
itself. If we made no difference between phenomena and beings-in-themselves, that 
is, if we knew the being-in-itself through cognisance, this would mean that the more 
perfect our cognisance is – while cognisance is the more perfect the more necessity 
or causality is within it – the more human freedom turns to nothing. Simplifying a 
little, but probably not incorrectly, we may say: the world of cognisance 
(knowledge) is a world of necessity, while the world of action is a world of freedom. 
Let us assume, Kant argues, that morality presupposes freedom, but the difference 
between things as objects of experience and as beings-in-themselves had not been 
made; in this case the thesis of causality acquires a universal meaning. ―I could not 
say about the same being, e.g. the human soul, [...] that its will is free, but it is still 
subject to natural necessity‖; in this case ―freedom and morality with it [...] must 
give way to the mechanisms of nature‖.2 To put it briefly: ―If phenomena are things-
in-themselves, then freedom is beyond recovery.‖3 There would only remain one 
world, the natural world guided by necessary laws (revealed by scientific 
knowledge, as a world-in-itself), and in its closed causality chain the human soul 
would itself be only one link, deterministically defined. The Critique of Pure Reason 
paves the way at this point for the Critique of Practical Reason, ethics. The 
deficiencies and the limited, imperfect nature of our human cognisance ground 
precisely the possibility of our action as free, moral beings.  
 This recognition is the key to understand Kant‘s thesis, not easily 
comprehensible, and often explained and misinterpreted, that ―I had to deny 
knowledge in order to make room for faith [Ich mußte das Wissen aufheben, um 
zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen]‖.4 Kant reduced knowledge in order to make 
place for freedom, morals and faith. The knowledge that he wanted to ―remove‖ or 
―deny‖ in the first place, is expressed in the haughty statement of dogmatic 
metaphysics that it is able to know the ―ultimate‖ things – God, freedom, 
immortality – with the help of theoretical reason; and in this regard Kant does not 
only claim that there is no such kind of cognition, and to state this is mere deception, 
but, beyond this, also that precisely this dogmatism is the true source of faithlessness 
and immorality.
5
 Probably the easiest way to shed light on this state of facts is to 
                                                 
1
 See Kritik der reinen Vernunft, BXXV: „Daher ist eine Kritik, welche die erstere [the 
theoretical reason] einschränkt, so fern zwar negativ, aber, indem sie dadurch zugleich ein 
Hinderniß, welches den letzteren [practical] Gebrauch einschränkt, oder gar zu vernichten 
droht, aufhebt, in der That von positivem und sehr wichtigem Nutzen, so bald man überzeugt 
wird, daß es einen schlechterdings nothwendigen praktischen Gebrauch der reinen Vernunft 
(den moralischen) gebe […].‖ 
2
 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B XXVIIff. 
3
 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 537=B565; 
4
  Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B XXX 
5
 Cf. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B XXX. 
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suppose for a moment that we possess immovably stable, indubitable knowledge 
about all this, then we ask: what happens then with human freedom and ethical 
actions? It is worth mentioning an example of Karl Popper, completely Kantian in 
this respect. He writes that, supposing one could precisely foresee what will happen 
in the future, the question of how one should act, for instance which side should one 
take or what kind of morality should one accept, still could not be clearly decided. 
The question whether one would accept the morality of the future – just for being the 
morality of the future – is a moral question in itself, and no kind of knowledge or 
anticipation of the future may help to answer it. ―The fundamental decision cannot 
be derived from any knowledge of the future.‖1 Rorty fully agrees with Popper at 
this point: Marx was wrong to think that starting from Hegel‘s dialectics one may 
make predictions for the future, and Popper rightfully criticized this kind of 
historicism.
2
 Seen from here and coming back to Kant, one could say that the desire 
for an absolute metaphysical knowledge is connected to, or is a sign of, moral 
weakness. It is characterized by what Kant said about looking into the future in his 
fundamental work on the philosophy of religion: ―In my opinion there can be no 
certainty in this respect, and it is not even beneficial from a moral point of view.‖3 
The weight, responsibility and dignity of action – action which is not a technical 
production – are given precisely by the risk that we cannot fully see its effects and 
consequences, and indeed, it is not even desirable that we do. If someone still thinks 
it is desirable, since – using Popper‘s above example – he wants to stand on the side 
of the winner order in the future – well, we could hardly be very happy about it, 
even if the will of knowledge is usually regarded as a praiseworthy thing. 
 This Kantian thought was preserved and applied in neo-Kantianism. The 
novelty and specific contribution of neo-Kantianism was the inclusion of history 
(quite neglected by Kant) into the Kantian worldview, the elaboration of the 
concepts of culture and cultural science, and its protection against natural sciences. 
The neo-Kantian addition to Kant, seen from our perspective, lies in the fact that it 
completes the field of ethical action with a domain of being yet unknown for the 
Enlightenment thinker, a domain called history and culture. It was primarily the 
Baden-based neo-Kantianism that undertook the defence of history and the 
compatibility of freedom and history, against the reduction of history to knowledge 
and cognition.  
 ―If we could predict the future in its individuality‖, writes Rickert, ―if we 
knew precisely about everything that must come, then will and action would 
immediately lose their sense.‖ The ―irrationality‖ of reality sets the limits of the 
natural scientific thinking as soon as individuality comes forth; but this irrationality, 
this impossibility to be known ―is one of the major assets for him who always strives 
forward ambitiously. Merciful is the hand that wrapped the future for us [...] in an 
impenetrable veil. If future in its individuality and strangeness were also the object 
                                                 
1
 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), 2
nd
 
ed, vol. 2, 206. 
2
 AOC 19. 
3
 Kant: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, Kant, Werkausgabe, Werke in 
zwölf Bänden, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, vol. VIII, 724: „Gewißheit in Ansehung 
derselben ist dem Menschen weder möglich, noch, so viel wir einsehen, moralisch zuträglich.‖ 
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of our knowledge, then it could never be the object of our will. In a world that 
became perfectly rational nobody would be able to act.‖1 ―A metaphysical idealism‖, 
he writes later, ―which is supposed to know the general evolutionary law of the 
world, makes the one-time course of history just as meaningless and futile as 
metaphysical naturalism, which considers the absolute reality a permanent cycle. [...] 
History is only possible as long as we do not grasp the world metaphysically.‖2 
 History is unknowable but free: this is how one could summarize the 
message of Rickert and neo-Kantianism, but this thesis could also be put this way: 
history is unknowable because it is free – and the pledge of its freedom is its 
unpredictability and unknowability. The world of knowledge is a world of necessity, 
while the world of action is a world of freedom, I summarized Kant‘s tenets above, 
and now it could be added: if something like history must belong to the world of 
action, if actions take place in a domain called history, then they must also be 
unknowable.  
 The Kantian duality of metaphysics and ethics, knowledge and freedom 
(free action) can also be found in Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard criticized Hegelians for 
being able to fly in the cosmic heights of absolute knowledge, that is, ―they can 
mediate Christianity and paganism, [...] they can play with the titanic forces of 
history,‖ but they are unable to tell the simple man what to do with his life‖, for 
―they do not know what to do themselves.‖3 Hegelian philosophy is only valid 
supposing that the present is an absolute age, that there is no future – a supposition 
which is very difficult to be embraced by the existing man, to build his life upon it. 
But if there is future, then the age in which the philosopher lives is not an absolute 
age, if the world history is not over, then ―the system is in permanent becoming‖, 
that is, there is no system, which means here: knowledge has no system.
4
 Hegelians, 
says Kierkegaard, interchange two spheres, the sphere of thinking and that of 
freedom; and in the sphere of thinking, where Hegel‘s philosophy dwells, ―necessity 
                                                 
1
 Heinrich Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 2
nd
 ed. (Tübingen: 
Mohr, 1913), 464: „Könnten wir die Zukunft wirklich in ihrer Individualität vorausberechnen, 
und wüssten wir also genau, was kommen muss, so verlöre sofort alles Wollen und Handeln 
seinen Sinn. Wir haben daher nur Grund, uns zu freuen, dass es keine historischen Gesetze giebt. 
Die Irrationalität der Wirklichkeit, die allem naturwissenschaftlichen Begreifen eine Grenze setzt, 
gehört zugleich zu den höchsten Gütern für den, der immer strebend sich bemüht. Es ist eine 
gnädige Hand, die für uns Menschen die Zukunft in einen undurchdringlichen Schleier gehüllt 
hat. Wäre auch das Künftige in seiner Individualität Objekt unseres Wissens, so würde es niemals 
Objekt unseres Wollens sein. In einer vollkommen rationalen Welt kann Niemand wirken―. ―To 
act‖ means of course here to act morally. „In einer rational gewordenen Welt‖, he writes towards 
the end of his book, „gäbe es nicht nur keine Geschichte und kein sittliches Wirken sondern auch 
keine Religion‖ (ibid., 641). 
2
 Ibid., 578f.: "ein metaphysischer Idealismus, der das Entwicklungsgesetz der Welt zu kennen 
glaubt, macht den Verlauf der Geschichte genau ebenso sinnlos und überflüssig wie ein 
metaphysischer Naturalismus, der die absolute Wirklichkeit für einen ewigen Kreislauf hält. 
[…] Nur so lange wir die Welt nicht metaphysisch begreifen können und die empirische 
Wirklichkeit in einem irrationalen Verhältniss zu Werthen steht, ist also Geschichte möglich.‖ 
3
 Kierkegaard: Entweder – Oder, 721. 
4
 Ibid., 723, the following two quotations: ibid., 723, 724.  
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rules‖. Thereby we return back again to the Kantian difference between the world of 
knowlede and the world of freedom. In this respect Hegel‘s absolute philosophy is a 
philosophy of necessity – a critique that the old Schelling already formulated against 
Hegel.
1
 And if Kierkegaard says that ―philosophy is unable to send man to action‖, 
this evidently refers to Hegel‘s philosophy, which refuses to be aware of the other 
sphere, that of freedom, or is only aware of it in such a way that it has eliminated its 
freedom in the necessity of thinking.  
 The basic ambition of foundationalism, namely to acquire well-founded 
(metaphysical) knowledge and to ground practical actions on this knowledge, 
becomes thus fundamentally questionable: the very concept of knowledge becomes 
thus unstable. The result could be summed up approximately like this: human mind 
is unable to attain a coherent, ―objective‖ knowledge of the world, but this may be 
not  a great problem. We may not be able to reach our desired goal, but possibly it is 
not even desirable in all repects to reach this goal. The analysis can shed light on the 
unreflected, naive, even dogmatic desire for an absolute knowledge of the world. For 
if we ask why we need such an absolute knowledge, why we long for it, then the 
answer would be this: in oder that we may know our purpose in life, the way to act 
correctly, and get guidance for our actions. But if our reconstruction has been 
meaningful then we might realize: although we cannot reach our goal, it is not at all 
certain that attaining it would fulfil the hopes we connect to it. If we could somehow 
peep into the absolute order of the world, would it offer us any clear guidance as to 
what our purpose is? And if so, if we could so indecently look into the ways of 
destiny or providence, would we not become a little like a cheater, for whom the 
game is already over?
2
 
The summary of the Kantian tradition is largely similar to how Rorty 
understands Kant‘s work. At an important section of the concluding part of his 
major work, there is a fundamental reference to Kant. Rorty places emphasis on 
Kant‘s dismissal of the traditional concept of mind in order to make place for moral 
faith, and considers this idea precisely as Kant‘s ―greatness.‖ What this is about – he 
sums up briefly and to the point – is ―the philosopher‘s special form of bad faith – 
substituting pseudo-cognition for moral choice‖.3 ―Kant‘s greatness – he writes – 
was to have seen through the ‘metaphysical‘ form of this attempt, and to have 
destroyed the traditional conception of reason to make room for moral faith. Kant 
gave us a way of seeing scientific truth as something that could never supply an 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Schellings sämmtliche Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart und Augsburg: J. G. Cotta, 
1856–61), vol. 10, 159.  
2
 This is similar to how Wittgenstein questions the supposition of the immortality of the soul: 
„Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say 
of its eternal survival after death; but, in any case, this assumption completely fails to 
accomplish the purpose for which it has always been intended. Or is some riddle solved by 
my surviving for ever? Is not this eternal life itself as much of a riddle as our present life?‖ 
(Tractatus logico–philosophicus, 6.4312). Wittgenstein‘s words can be understood as being 
meaningful for the immortality of the soul as long as it is expressed as a desire against the 
finiteness of human life. But if we wish to think it autonomously then it becomes just as 
mysterious as what it should have had to offer a result for as against a mystery.  
3
 PMN 383. 
Philobiblon – Vol. XX (2015) No.1 
 172 
answer to our demand for a point, a justification, a way of claiming that our moral 
decision about what to do is based on knowledge of the nature of the world.‖1 
Clearly, this is what Rorty considers to be Kant‘s basic idea. At the same time, he 
also criticizes Kant for not being able to keep up with this idea, and for having 
formulated his diagnosis on science – ―unfortunately‖ – under the heading 
―inevitable subjective conditions‖, claiming that there was a procedure of decision 
for solving moral dilemmas.
2
 Seen from here, Kant is part of the main trend of 
European philosophy starting with Plato, and criticized by Rorty, that is concerned 
first and foremost with putting philosophy on the stable path of science.
3
  
Returning to the tradition starting from Kant, the thesis of the independence 
and unconnectedness of (scientific) knowledge and (practical) action (a moral and 
political decision and position) also plays an important role in the work of Max 
Weber, connected on several points to neo-Kantianism. As he exposed it probably 
most clearly in his influential lecture Science as a Vocation, scientific knowledge 
and practical decisions form two separate, unrelated realms. No science is capable to 
ground the individual‘s decisions (religious, political, or regarding one‘s 
worldview). Such things as ―scientific worldview‖ or ―scientific politics‖ are 
therefore impossible, they serve only to conceal decisions or shift the responsibility 
for autonomous action onto some kind of ―knowledge‖.4 The very question about the 
meaning of science is not a question to be answered with the means of science. The 
distinction of facts and values, science and politics/ethics, the recognition that 
practical positions cannot be scientifically grounded may give reason to a certain 
degree of disappointment or disillusionment (in virtue of questioning the 
omnipotence of science) against the background of the hope of some kind of 
ultimate metaphysical knowledge of the world. Its acceptance is therefore a matter 
of ―intellectual rectitude‖,5 which can hardly be proved at all with scientific means. 
The best way to characterize Weber‘s stance is by a thesis of Karl Popper. Although 
―ethics is not a science‖, Popper writes, and ―there is no ‗rational scientific basis‘ of 
ethics‖, ―there is an ethical basis of science‖6 It is worth mentioning: this difference 
shows significant parallels with Gadamer‘s claim, in the preface of the second 
edition of his major work, that, although the ―hermeneutics‖ he elaborated is not a 
science – not a ―system of professional rules‖ or ―methodology‖ – but it ―invites to 
‗scientific‘ correctness‖.7 
                                                 
1
 Ibid., emphasis in the original. See also CIS 34. 
2
 PMN 383. 
3
 This is the interpretation of Kant that Rorty has in mind when he mentions Kant together 
with Plato, or talks about a ―Plato-Kant canon‖. (See e.g. CIS 33, 45, 61, 76, 78f, 96f, 106, 
118, 154; PP 2, 65, 157; PSH xvii, 34.) It is this Kant who seeks certainty, and not the Kant 
to demolishes knowledge for the sake of faith that he will oppose Sartre to (as we shall see 
later). See PSH 13: „Jean-Paul Sartre seemed to me right when he denounced Kant‘s self-
deceptive quest for certainty‖. 
4
 See Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, eds. David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, 
Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004, 17ff, 26ff.  
5
 Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, 20 (―intellektuelle Rechtschaffenheit‖). 
6
 Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol 2, 238. 
7
 Gadamer, GW 2, 438: „‗wissenschaftliche‗ Redlichkeit―. 
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The thesis of the difference of scientific knowledge and moral responsibility 
also appears in Paul Feyerabend, radical representative of the philosophy of science, 
rethinking Karl Popper‘s position. Knowledge offers certainty and security, action 
offers uncertainty and risks. ―Certainty – writes Feyerabend – if it were attainable, 
would mean the absence of responsibility. It is precisely the other way round: since 
certainty is unattainable, therefore we accept the responsibility and become adults. It 
is interesting to see that the researchers of epistemology and theory of science strive 
for relations in which we would be less mature than we would like.‖1 The desire to 
escape responsibility in this context goes together with renouncing human maturity, 
with the childish desire to remain immature, to remain forever under age. The 
question of how we can act if there is no certainty, can be answered like this: the 
question is bad or of bad faith. We can act only if there is no certainty. This position 
parallels the above cited formulation of Rickert‘s: if ―the future were the object of 
our knowledge, then it could never be the object of our will. In a world that became 
perfectly rational nobody would be able to act.‖ 
With respect to Heidegger, a short reference may suffice, which claims that 
for him science and the scientific attitude is just one of the modes of being of the 
human Dasein – not the single one, and not the most original one.2 One of these 
modes of being is the authentic being – in which man appropriates himself and – 
relating to the Feyerabend-quotation – gains or rather wins his maturity for itself. In 
order to attain this, however, the derivative mode of being of the contemplative 
knowledge of the world offers no help. The assuming of one‘s thrownness, to own 
up to the being that relates to death, responsibility and conscience: these are the 
concepts that describe for Heidegger the transition to authentic existence – and this 
is a completely different level than the possibly ―objective‖ definition of the merely 
existing things.  
Rorty himself offers important additions to the interpretation of Sartre‘s ideas 
from our perspective. Commenting on Sartre, Rorty emphasizes: the attempt to 
acquire objective knowledge on the world and ourselves is for Sartre none other than 
an attempt to ward off the responsibility for choosing our own project.
3
 Rorty‘s 
interpretation can also be justified by a fragment he did not analyze. If for Sartre man 
is a being that (in Sartre‘s peculiar formulation) is what it is not, then it means that – as 
he explicitly states – any statement I make about myself becomes false in the very 
                                                 
1
 Paul Feyerabend, Wieder den Methodenzwang. Skizzen einer anarchistischen Erkenntnistheo-
rie, (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976), 49. ―Gewißheit – wenn sie erreichbar wäre – 
bedeutet Fehlen der Verantwortlichkeit. Vielmehr ist es so: da sich Gewißheit nicht erreichen 
läßt, nimmt man die Verantwortung auf sich und wird ein reifer Mensch. Es ist interessant zu 
sehen, daß Erkenntnistheoretiker und Wissenschaftstheoretiker Verhältnisse anstreben, in denen 
unsere Reife geringer ist als wir vielleicht wünschen.‖ 
2
 SZ, 4. §., 11.: ―Wissenschaftliche Forschung ist nicht die einzige und nicht die nächste 
mögliche Seinsart dieses Seienden.‖ In his pragmatist stance Rorty fully agrees with this 
approach; he emphatically and approvingly mentions that in Being and Time Heidegger 
considers ―‘objective scientific knowledge‘ as a secondary, derivative form of Being-in-the 
World‖ (PP 2, 11) 
3
 PMN 361.: ―[Sartre] sees the attempt to gain an objective knowledge of the world, and thus 
of oneself, as an attempt to avoid the responsibility for choosing one‘s project.‖ 
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moment of utterance,
1
 and this also confirms Rorty‘s interpretation. The need for 
―objective knowledge‖ is connected for Sartre to ―bad faith‖ (―mauvaise fois‖). The 
attempt to grasp ourselves in some kind of ultimage objective description (suggested 
by the ―spirit of seriousness‖2) is therefore not only futile and hopeless, but – even 
more importantly – the aspiration itself is conceived in bad faith. Lying behind it is the 
tacit intention to turn the being-for-itself into being-in-itself, into a thing.  
 ―This attempt to slough off responsibility," writes Rorty, "is what Sartre 
describes as the attempt to turn oneself into a thing-into an etre-en-soi. In the visions 
of the epistemologist, this incoherent notion takes the form of seeing the attainment 
of truth as a matter of necessity, either the 'logical' necessity of the transcendentalist 
or the 'physical' necessity of the evolutionary 'naturalizing' epistemologist. From 
Sartre's point of view, the urge to find such necessities is the urge to be rid of one's 
freedom to erect yet another alternative theory or vocabulary. Thus the edifying 
philosopher [the sort whose primary concern is not knowledge of metaphysical 
truths, but the edification of humans – I.M.F.]  who points out the incoherence of the 
urge is treated as a 'relativist,' one who lacks moral seriousness, because he does not 
join in the common human hope that the burden of choice will pass away."
3
 Sartre 
was definitely lacking ―moral seriousness‖ since he did not want at all to take off the 
―burden of choice‖ from people‘s shoulders, and in his major work he thoroughly 
criticized the spirit of seriousness (―esprit de sérieux‖), and referred ironically to 
―serious people‖ even in his popular lecture.4 
 Rorty‘s remark that Sartre (and what Rorty calls edifying philosophy) ―lacks 
moral seriousness‖ should evidently not be understood literally, containing as it does 
irony. Sartre (similarly to all representatives of the mentioned tradition, beginning with 
Kant) embodied and expressed a kind of (often rigorous) moral attitude and strictness – 
one that rejects any kind of self-deception and self-delusion, any kind of wishful 
thinking, one that is ready and able to ruthlessly confront the fallibility of the contingent 
man which urges him to ―substitute pseudo-cognition for moral choice.‖5 However, 
                                                 
1
 EN 151; cf. also ibid, 483: the being-for-itself is always different from what may be said 
about it („toujours autre chose que ce qu'on peut dire de lui‖; emphasis in the original). 
2
 See Sartre: ―Materialism and Revolution‖, Sartre, Literary and Philosophical Essays, 215, 
where Sartre writes about materialism that it is „one of the forms of the spirit of seriousness and 
of flight from one's own self‖ (translation modified; see Sartre, Situtions, vol. III, Paris: 
Gallimard, 1949, 162: „une des formes de l'esprit de sérieux et de la fuite devant soi-même‖). 
3
 PMN 376. Rorty writes further on: ―Sartre adds to our understanding of the visual imagery 
which has set the problems of Western philosophy‖ by showing the traditional image of the 
―unveiled mirror of Nature‖ as the image of God. From this point of view Rorty concludes: „to 
look for commensuration rather than simply continued conversation–to look for a way of 
making further redescription unnecessary by finding a way of reducing all possible descriptions 
to one–is to attempt escape from humanity‖ (PMN 376f.). In a later writing, explaining Sartre, 
Rorty writes: ―We shall not need a picture of ‘the human self‘ in order to have morality‖ (PP 2, 
160), cf. also CIS 42, PP 2, 132.: ―Sartre‘s point that we have a tendency to repudiate and evade 
this freedom of choice is perfectly just‖. 
4
 See EN 674, also: Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un humanisme (Paris: Nagel, 1946), see: 
http://www.mediasetdemocratie.net/Textes/Existentialisme.htm> 
5
 PMN 383. 
Philobiblon – Vol. XX (2015) No.1 
 175 
the measures are reverse for the man who escapes responsibility and himself; for 
him, it is the rejection of the urgent desire for certainty-security-stability that counts 
as ―lack of moral seriousness‖. Be it as it may: Rorty is receptive of Sartre‘s critique 
of the ―spirit of seriousness‖; his answer – as I have outlined earlier – is irony (and 
hope, as will be mentioned in the concluding part).  
 ―Jean-Paul Sartre seemed to me right when he denounced Kant‘s self-
deceptive quest for certainty‖ – says Rorty.1 In his major work, in reference to Quine 
and Sellars, Rorty talked about a concept of philosophy, trying at the same time to 
raise sympathy for it: ―holism produces, as Quine has argued in detail and Sellars 
has said in passing, a conception of philosophy which has nothing to do with the 
quest for certainty.‖2 This certainty is illusory and unachievable: the quest for it is 
nothing else than self-deception, evasion of life, and all this in the best of the cases. 
For a false certainty and the illusion of certainty may stabilize and grow into an 
ideology, they may lead to self-justification, in the possession of which man may 
pose as morally superior. The moral suspicion might extend to other philosophical 
disciplines in addition to ethics, and ultimately also to philosophy as such.  
 
*** 
 
This paper could be concluded with the following remarks. One of the basic 
metaphysical questions of Kant – the third one – sounds like this: ―Was darf ich 
hoffen?‖ (What may I hope for?)3, and for Rorty also it is primarily about hope. 
From Rorty‘s perspective, hope plays a fundamental role both in the lives of people 
and in the philosopher‘s life. The expression itself appears often in his texts and in 
the title of one of his books as well: Philosophy and Social Hope. One chapter of 
this book indicates the narrow context of this phrase: Hope in Place of Knowledge. 
Hope stands, therefore, for Rorty – just like for Kant – in the place of knowledge. If 
Kant demolished knowledge to make place for faith (Ich mußte also das Wissen 
aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen),
4
 than we could state by analogy: 
Rorty demolished knowledge to make room for hope. Solidarity for Rorty does not 
depend on the existence of common truths, common language, or some final 
                                                 
1
 PSH 13. See also the the bibliographical indications in note 81. 
2
 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979, 171. See also J. Grondin, ―Die Hermeneutik als Konsequenz des kritischen Rationalismus‖, 
Philosophia naturalis 32 (1995), book 2, reprint: Hermeneutik und Naturalismus, ed. B. Kanit-
scheider, F. J. Wetz (Tübingen: Mohr, 1998), 42f. „[...] die kartesianische oder, im allgemeinen, 
die wissenschaftliche Sicherheitsobsession einer ‘Flucht‘ des Daseins vor seiner eigenen Zeit-
lichkeit oder Geschichtlichkeit entstamme. Heidegger und die Hermeneutik sehen nun in dieser 
»Sorge um Gewißhet« eines der Grundmotive der abendländischen Philosophie und Wissen-
schaft, sofern sie nach »letzten Fundamenten« streben‖ 
3
 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B833: ―Alles Interesse meiner Vernunft (das spekulative 
sowohl, als das praktische) vereinigt sich in folgenden drei Fragen: 1. Was kann ich wissen? 
2. Was soll ich tun? 3. Was darf ich hoffen?‖. See also: Logik. Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen. 
ed. G. B. Jäsche, in Kant: Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik. 2, Werkausgabe. ed. W. 
Weischedel,  Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1974, vol. 6. 448. 
4
 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, BXXXI  
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vocabulary, but on the receptivity for pain, suffering and humiliation, and the 
common hope that everybody‘s own world with the little childish things and 
individual vocabulary would not be destroyed.
1
 
 As Rorty exposed in his influential writing discussing the common features of 
the Bible and the Communist Manifesto, both teach the sensitivity to inequality, and 
feed the hope in the future. Both want to encourage, and not formulate knowledge 
claims (about the second coming of Christ, or about the realization of the communist 
society). Christianity and socialism – they both mean the same, so something like 
―Christian socialism‖ is almost a pleonasm: ―nowadays you cannot hope for the 
fraternity which the Gospels preach without hoping that democratic governments will 
redistribute money and opportunity in a way that the market never will.‖.2   
The question ―Was darf ich hoffen?‖ is for Kant sharply separated from the 
question ―Was kann ich wissen?‖. And not by chance. If I knew everything that was 
possible to know – everything I want to know – I would not have much to hope for. 
Hope is only possible where knowledge does not have access to. Hope is at home in 
the world of action – it motivates, urges and guides our actions. As such, it is 
connected to practical life, and not to knowledge. I do not – I cannot – have hopes 
about things that I know.
3
 The life of omniscience, the life lived in omniscience 
would therefore be a life without hope, that is, a hope-less life in the emphatic sense 
of the word and in each of its multiple senses: perhaps not unthinkable for Gods, but 
hardly conceivable for humans. 
 
Translated by Emese Czintos 
  
                                                 
1
 CIS 92. Cf. ibid., 89, where Rorty writes about the little things of the child that he fantasizes 
about, and that some adults would tend to describe as ―trash‖ and throw them away.  
2
 Cf. PSH 201ff. quote on 205.  
3
 And what I hope for cannot be the object of my knowledge. The statement ―I know that 
twice two is four‖ can hardly be meaningfully replaced by the statement (which is doubtful 
as it is) ―I hope that twice two is four‖. The latter cannot be deduced from the former, nor is 
it some kind of weakened form of the former. Knowledge may have its gradations (―I know‖, 
―I don‘t know‖, ―I am certain‖, ―I am uncertain‖), but I cannot be connected to the object of 
my knowledge by a practical – hopeful – interest. In other words: what has got into the scope 
of knowledge, cannot get into the scope of hope, and vice versa. In his writing discussing the 
parallels between the Bible and the Communist Manifesto, Rorty claims: ―there is a 
difference between knowledge and hope. Hope often takes the form of false prediction, as it 
did in both documents [...] When reading the texts themselves we should skip slightly past 
the predictions, and concentrate on the expression of hope.‖ (see PSH 204f.) 
